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Abstract 
Insider threat has become a serious information security issues within organizations. In this paper, we analyze the 
problem of insider threats with emphases on the Cloud computing platform. Security is one of the major anxieties 
when planning to adopt the Cloud. This paper will contribute towards the conception of mitigation strategies that can 
be relied on to solve the malicious insider threats. While Cloud computing relieves organizations from the burden of 
the data management and storage costs, security in general and the malicious insider threats in particular is the main 
concern in cloud environments. We will analyses the existing mitigation strategies to reduce malicious insiders 
threats in Cloud computing.  
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1. Introduction 
Cybersecurity has recently received tremendous publicity in mass media with emphases on externally 
perpetrated attacks. Although the insider threat has remained the most consistent issue facing 
organisation, it has not received the attention it deserves. (Claycomb & Nicoll, 2012) defined malicious 
insider as “a current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized 
access to an organizations network, system or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a 
manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organizations 
information or information systems.”  
There is ample evidence that insider threats are real and rising to the level of an external threat. For 
example, (Richardson, 2008) indicated that about 44% of all organisations experienced abuse of computer 
systems, loss of laptops and theft of customer data. (Peters, 2009) also reported that 60% of financial 
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losses were caused by insiders. Table 1 shows four categories of malicious insider threats along with the 
percentage of respondents that view each threat as "major" as reported by Computer Economics (2010). 
The moderate level of concern about malicious insiders indicated in Table 1 is both in conflict with the 
number of incidents actually reported by these same organizations as well as the threat is less appreciated 
by the organisations. 
 
Organisation 
Sizes 
Unauthorised Confidential Data Fraudulent 
Transactions 
System 
Sabotage Access Disclosure 
Small 29% 31% 24% 24% 
Medium/Large 30% 38% 30% 26% 
 
Table 1: Four categories of malicious insider threats 
 
In this paper, we study the problem of insider threats within the domain of Cloud computing. Because of 
the economic and technical benefits it offers, Cloud computing has recently gained significant acceptance. 
Organizations can outsource their IT infrastructure to the Cloud and get benefits that include rapid 
provisioning, scalability, and cost advantages. Although, organizations appreciate the flexibility, 
scalability, and resource management provided by Cloud computing platforms, security in general and 
malicious insider threats in particular has been considered as one of the main concerns in embracing 
Cloud computing. Insider attacks are always identified as a high-impact risk as malicious insiders can 
affect the security of many users. Furthermore, this risk of insider attacks will be more serious and 
damaging when involving Cloud computing. Thus, securing Cloud computing against the insider threats 
is important to achieve Cloud users’ trust. In this paper, we will analyse and discuss various Cloud 
specific insider threats. Using real insider attacks cases, we will show how the inherent Cloud 
architectures facilitate insider attacks to be successfully mounted.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the Cloud Computing and security 
issues. Section 3 explains the malicious insider attacks specific to Cloud computing. Section 4 discusses 
the analysis of the existing mitigation strategies and techniques to reduce malicious insiders in the Cloud 
Computing. Section 5 concludes the paper and presents future direction. 
2. Cloud Computing and Security Issues 
Cloud computing is a type of parallel and distributed system consisting of a collection of inter-connected 
and virtualized computers that are dynamically provisioned and presented as one or more unified 
computing resources based on service-level agreements established through negotiation between the 
service provider and consumers (Buyya, Yeo, Venugopal, Broberg, & Brandic, 2009). Cloud Computing 
is a new paradigm for hosting and delivering services over the Internet. It merges many computing 
concepts and technologies such as Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), Web 2.0, virtualization and 
other technologies that depend on the Internet. According to (Jianfeng & Zhibin, 2010), there are three 
service models of Cloud Computing: 
 
a) Software as a Service (SaaS) – The capability provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s 
application running on a Cloud infrastructure. In this model, software application is hosted as service 
and end users use the application on the web browser. 
b) Platform as a Service (PaaS) – The capability provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the Cloud 
infrastructure his own applications without installing any platform or tools on their local machines. In 
this model, end-user creates, tests and upload application using tools and libraries hosted by the 
service provider. 
. 
c) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) – The capability provided to the consumer is to provision 
processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources where the consumer is 
able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications. This 
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model involves hosting of hardware computing services like storage, hard drive, servers, and network 
components. Service provider is responsible for maintenance and managing all these resources. 
Cloud computing enables ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources such as networks, servers, storage, applications, and services that can 
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction 
(Brown, 2011).  
 
Cloud systems are very economical and useful for businesses of all sizes (Onwubiko, 2010) as it offers: 
(i) limitless flexibility with access to millions of different databases, and the ability to combine them into 
customized services; (ii) better reliability and security since users no longer need to worry about their 
hardware failure or hardware being stolen; (iii) enhanced collaboration by enabling online sharing of 
information and applications, the Cloud offers users new ways of working together and cooperate; (iv) 
portability since users can access their data from anywhere; (v) simpler devices as the data is stored and 
processed in the Cloud, users simply need an interface to access and use this data, play games, etc.; (vi) 
unlimited storage since Cloud offers a large expandable storage that can be upgraded when needed; and 
(vii) access to quick processing power using the latest technology and infrastructure make the delivery of 
services faster. 
 
Although there are many benefits to adopting Cloud Computing, there are also some limitations 
associated with it. Security is the biggest issues in Cloud computing. This is  because Cloud offers storage 
service on a remote location and the consumers must trust the Cloud provider even though the consumers 
are unaware of what happens to their data (AlZain, Pardede, Soh, & Thom, 2012). External data storage, 
dependency on the public Internet, lack of control of the data and multi-tenancy collectively make Cloud 
computing  risky to many security concerns. 
 
As individuals and enterprises produce more and more data that must be stored and utilized (emails, 
personal health records, photo albums, fax documents, financial transactions, and so on), they are 
motivated to outsource their local complex data management systems to the Cloud owing to its greater 
flexibility and cost-efficiency. However, once users no longer physically possess their data, its 
confidentiality and integrity can be at risk. Traditionally, to control the distribution of privacy-sensitive 
data, users establish a trusted server to store data locally in clear, and then control that server to check 
whether requesting users present proper credential before being granted access to the data. From a 
security standpoint, this access control system is no longer applicable when data is housed on the Cloud. 
This is because the users and Cloud servers are located in different geographic locations and the server 
might no longer be fully trusted for defining and enforcing access control policies and managing user 
details. In the event of either server compromise or potential insider attacks, users’ private data might 
even be exposed (Kui, Cong, & Qian, 2012). Loss of direct control of their data is the main security 
concerns for the clients. By moving their private data to the Cloud, users are forced to trust the Cloud 
service providers with the secure and proper management of their data. 
 
Among security threats in the Cloud, insider threats such as malicious system administrators pose a 
serious risk to clients (Sundararajan, Narayanan, Pavithran, Vorungati, & Achuthan, 2011). The problem 
is challenging because the system administrators have elevated privileges for performing genuine system 
maintenance and administration tasks. An attack often posited by such  insiders will always result in loss 
of data confidentiality and/or integrity. These insiders may be motivated financially. This is a common 
motivation for theft of intellectual property or fraud. Another attack possibility that must be considered is 
IT sabotage where employees seek to harm an employer’s IT infrastructure. An insider’s grudge against 
the Cloud provider could result in harm to a victim organization with the intention of damaging the Cloud 
provider’s reputation (Claycomb & Nicoll, 2012). 
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An attacker that has access to the Cloud storage component is able to take snapshots or alter data in the 
storage. This might be done once, multiple times, or continuously. An attacker that also has access to the 
processing logic of the Cloud can also modify the functions and their input and output data. Even though 
in the majority of cases it may be legitimate to assume a Cloud provider to be honest and handling the 
customers’ affairs in a respectful and responsible manner, there still remains a risk of malicious 
employees of the Cloud provider, successful attacks by third parties, or of actions ordered by a subpoena 
(Bohli, Gruschka, Jensen, Iacono, & Marnau, 2013).  
3. Malicious Insiders Attack 
CERN (Institute, 2013) defines an insider threat as such “A malicious insider threat to an organization is a 
current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to an 
organization's network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that 
negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information or 
information systems.” Bishop and Gates (2008) defined an insider based on violation of a security policy 
using legitimate access and violation of an access control policy by obtaining unauthorized access. In the 
first case, the insiders perform some actions that is opposing to the security policy using their legitimate 
access. When the insiders have legitimate access to the data or resources and use that eligibility to provide 
the information to someone who does not have access or to deny access to someone who does have 
access. In the second case, the insiders misuse their eligibility to extend their privileges that enable them 
to break both the access control and security policies. They are considered key and trusted assets and are 
eligible the highest possible privileges for the systems they own. Excessive and unnecessary privileges 
can lead system owners to act in the way they please with very little restrictions and accountability (Sibai 
& Menasce, 2012). 
 
The malicious insiders can cause serious threats to an organization. They are well-trained and well-versed 
with the infrastructure, tools and equipment to operate their tasks. They are aware of missions, visions, 
standard operating procedures, rules and regulations, terms and conditions as well as policies of the 
organization. However, they can suddenly turn to be an adversary when they are not satisfied with the 
organization decision-making, their claims are not fulfilled, they are not fairly rewarded, and they are not 
well treated by the organization. They are more dangerous compared to external hacker because they 
could perform malicious action in a very structured way, smooth, faster, indistinctly that might severely 
impact the organization. 
 
Insider attacks can be executed by malicious employees at the provider’s or user’s location. This threat 
can break the trust of Cloud users on provider. A malicious insider can easily obtain passwords, 
cryptographic keys and files. These attacks may include diverse types of fraud, damage or theft of 
information and misuse of IT resources. The threat of malicious attacks has grown due to lack of 
transparency in Cloud provider’s processes and procedures. It means that a provider may not reveal how 
employees are granted access and how this access is monitored or how reports as well as policy 
compliances are analysed. Additionally, users have little visibility about the hiring practices of their 
provider that could open the door for an adversary, hackers or other Cloud intruders to steal confidential 
information or to take control over the Cloud. The level of access granted could enable attackers to collect 
confidential data or to gain complete control over the Cloud services with little or no risk of detection. 
Malicious insider attacks can damage the financial value as well as brand reputation of an organization. 
Moving critical applications and sensitive data to a public and shared Cloud environment is a major 
concern for organization. That is because organization has lost control of the data and totally depends on 
Cloud provider data security and defence. To alleviate these concerns, a Cloud solution provider must 
guarantee that customers can remain to experience the same security and privacy controls over their 
applications and services by providing evidence to these customers that their organization and customers 
are secure (Che Fauzi, Noraziah, Herawan, & Mohd. Zin, 2012). 
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4. Analysis of Mitigation Strategies 
Chen and Malin (2011) addressed the problem of managing sensitive information in Collaborative 
information systems (CIS) environment. They proposed a framework called Community-based Anomaly 
Detection System (CADS) to detect insider threats based on information recorded in the access logs of 
collaborative environments. CADS uses a formal statistical model to measure the deviation of users from 
the inferred communities to predict which users are anomalies by performing an analysis of CIS access 
logs and therefore learn the patterns of user behavior to detect anomalous insiders. 
 
Chia-Mei, Guan, Yu-Zhi, and Ya-Hui (2012) investigated the problem of sequence of attack behaviour to 
compromise the system in Cloud. A malicious attacker may combine multiple security vulnerabilities and 
often adopts persistent attack approach consisting of a sequence of attack behaviors into an intelligent 
attack. A malicious insider or service hijacking may abuse Cloud Computing or attack one or more 
machines in the Cloud. These cause more serious damage than in a network environment where machines 
are distributed and independent. Therefore the authors proposed Hidden Markov model to detect such 
attacks by examining the stages of an attack plan and analyzing logs to identify attack sequences. 
 
Jung-Ho, Min-Woo, Seon-Ho, and Tai-Myoung (2011) addressed the problem of insiders execute their 
authorization legitimately to leak information on network system. The insiders may use the privileges of a 
program and execute the program in abnormal ways so that they can achieve their attack goals. Therefore 
the authors applied attack tree and misuse monitor to reduce security violation by identifying the insider 
information, preventing insiders’ abnormal activities, preventing resource misuse and manage security 
policy and updating the database. 
 
Yaseen and Panda (2010) investigated the problem of malicious modifications by insiders in relational 
databases. Dependencies can be used by insiders to make changes to the unauthorized data. Insiders can 
study constraints on dependencies between tables, attributes and data items to modify data. Therefore 
hiding dependencies from insiders can prevent them from modifying the unauthorized data. However they 
still can find out the hidden dependencies by collaborating and sharing different dependencies 
information among them. Two methods have been developed to prevent modifications: cut algorithm and 
modification graph. The cut algorithm determines which dependencies should be hidden. Changes made 
by authorized and unauthorized insiders produce insiders’ modification graphs. The modification graph 
generated by algorithms shows the authorized and unauthorized data items that insider can modify. 
 
Parveen, Evans, Thuraisingham, Hamlen, and Khan (2011) addressed the problem of detecting insider 
threats in unbounded, evolving, and unlabeled large data stream. The authors proposed ensemble-based 
stream mining, unsupervised learning, and graph-based anomaly detection to the problem of insider threat 
detection as well as demonstrating that the ensemble-based approach is significantly more effective than 
traditional single-model methods.  
 
Brdiczka et al. (2012) addressed the problem of detecting malicious insider behavior through monitoring 
network activity and the use of enterprise applications using graph analysis, dynamic tracking, and 
machine learning. These tools can accurately identify known attacks, but they are reactive, and may be 
eluded by previously unseen, adversarial behaviors. Therefore the authors proposed an approach that 
combines Structural Anomaly Detection (SA) from social and information networks and Psychological 
Profiling (PP) of individuals. Psychological model will determine individuals who have the motivation 
and capability to carry out an attack. 
 
Nithiyanandam, Tamilselvan, Balaji, and Sivaguru (2012) proposed a framework consists of layers to 
monitor user activity for preventing insider malicious activities. The framework prevents insider 
abnormal activities on IS by monitoring the point of use activity. The framework monitors the data 
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transfer media’s and check for resource misuse by insider by comparing the resource transferred with the 
database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of approaches for mitigating insider threats based on collusion and platform. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Malicious insiders’ attacks that exist in the Cloud system attempting to exploit the weaknesses of the 
system pose a serious threat to organizations. With the flexibility of Cloud system the malicious insiders 
can manipulate the privileges to access the sensitive information remotely. Even worse, malicious activity 
from the inside Cloud provider system is hard to observe when there are collusion and collaboration 
between multiple insiders, insiders and outsiders within Cloud environment. And these could pose severe 
implications to data confidentiality, integrity and availability. However no approach has so far offered a 
satisfactory path towards a solution. Therefore this study will investigate the suitable mitigation strategies 
to overcome the problem. 
 
Approaches Collusion Detection Platform 
(Yaseen & Panda, 
2010) Yes Database 
 (Chen & Malin, 2011) No Database 
 (Chia-Mei et al., 2012) No Cloud 
(Jung-Ho et al., 2011) No Network 
(Parveen et al., 2011) No O/S 
(Brdiczka et al., 2012) No Network 
(Nithiyanandam et al., 
2012) No Network 
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